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Abstract. New media technologies are becoming an increasingly prominent constituent of everyday 
living, with their proliferation presenting new challenges to key aspects of the self, namely agency and 
identity. )e potential recalibration of these notions comes about through new forms of agency being 
produced when information technologies play an increasingly powerful role in our lives. In this context 
agency is not something that can be reified and easily measured, or understood as solely intentional 
human action. Instead, agency is understood as something that comes to be as practices of life mak-
ing. We take up these ideas in relation to people’s experiences with information technologies. )rough 
semi-structured interviews with members of the public from London and the South East of the UK, we 
analyse how information technologies potentially recalibrate people’s subjectivity through informational 
agency. Participants’ engagements with information technologies are more nuanced and complex than a 
‘either good or bad’ distinction. )is is one of the analytic foci of the paper, as information technologies, 
even when viewed with suspicion or as creating concern, are often willfully utilised due to the perceived 
benefits they can bring. We focus on the potential technologisation of identity and subjectivity through 
arguing that new forms of digitally mediated selves are produced when daily lives come to be defined 
more by information than by the flesh and blood of our bodies. We conclude by drawing attention to 
challenges facing our experiences, and understandings of, subjectivity brought about by the relentless 
informationalisation of life. 
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Raktažodžiai: informacinės visuomenės, veiksmas, sekimas, kasdienis gyvenimas.

KULTŪRA IR VISUOMENĖ. Socialinių tyrimų žurnalas. .  (). ISSN - 
Living in Information Societies
Ae continual rise in prominence of computer technologies in all domains 
of everyday living shows no sign of abating. We live in worlds whose infra-
structure is made up of increasing amounts of technology, much of which is 
designed to harvest and utilise information derived from us (Crang, Graham 
2007). With such technologies comes a potential different currency for social 
scientific concepts of the self, namely information. Computer technologies 
deal in information of varying nature (e.g. visual and non-visual), and since 
the dawn of the computer age increasing amounts of our lives have become 
informationalised (Webster 2006). In this paper we seek to explore some of 
the potential ways that information technologies are shaping our lives, before 
moving towards a notion of understanding subjectivity through the concept of 
digitally mediated selves. A key question raised by the gradual erosion of tradi-
tional notions of self (e.g. as defined by our bodies), is agency. When more and 
more information about us is being recorded, stored and used, who is it that is 
doing it, and to what end? Is control an issue, and if so, where does it reside? 
Aese questions are timely ones, as the amount of information derived from 
us and attempting to shape our future experiences increases exponentially, and 
shows no sign of abating. Computer science, for one, can tell us a lot about the 
technological capabilities of systems of information capture, storage and use, 
but cannot aid us in understanding the impact of said technologies on the pro-
duction of everyday life (Beer 2009). To do so requires analysis of the interface 
of bodies and technology; understanding how people’s experiences are shaped 
by interaction with information technologies. Ais involves addressing people’s 
lives not in terms of common dualistic distinctions, such as online vs oﬄine, 
or virtual vs real, but as produced at the interface of bodies and technologies, 
or what we call digitally mediated selves.
According to Nigel Arift, information has become a modern form of 
capital (2005) because individuals are becoming increasingly commodified 
through the insatiable appetite for personal information of information tech-
nologies. Key internet organisations such as Google have enjoyed meteoric 
growth due to their bulging databases, full of information about people’s 
preferences, which are so attractive to advertisers. Information has become a 
leading and valuable currency in the Western developed world (and is spread-
ing fast as more of the world becomes ‘connected’). Ais has led to increas-
ingly sophisticated ways of trying to gather more detailed information about 
our preferences and desires, and with that information, to direct us towards 
products and services that the computing power of software algorithms think 
we may want. For instance, search engines are not always as straightforward 
and benign as might be expected, e.g. Google operates a ‘personalised’ service 
that provides results according to individual past search histories providing an 
online ‘fingerprint’ of search history (Pariser 2011). Whilst people may think 
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they would receive the same results as someone else conducting an identi-
cal search, this is not the case, as information technologies become agents of 
attempting to organise our future lives through providing personalised services. 
Consequently, information has come to be seen as a constituent of our social 
worlds (Castells, Cardosa 2005; Castells 2004; Fuchs 2011; Webster 2006); 
more than just a mechanism to transmit and transport knowledge. Ae giving 
of constructive attributes that comes with such ideas is borne from the reality 
of technology acting with agency, with the software algorithms behind things 
such as internet search engines seen as a force for organising life, what David 
Beer terms “the implications of software ‘sinking’ into and ‘sorting’ aspects of 
everyday life” (2007, 987). Ais agency works to organise much of everyday 
living through vast networks of communication between computers, a large 
part of which operates outside of our conscious experience. It is against this 
backdrop of technological agency that human life is played out, through mul-
tiple engagements with networked technologies.
Ae above concerns lead to an account of a networked society, in which 
computer databases, social networking and organisational data storage form 
the technological grounds upon which daily life occurs. Ae immersion of 
human cognition in technologies has led to the suggestion that the latter now 
act as ‘thought prosthetics’ (Turkle 2005), with thought conceptualized as 
a distributed process involving biology and technology. Functions previously 
seen as interior (e.g. cognitive function) now become externalised through 
body-technology relations. Ais is seen as a result of the gradual informational-
isation of life, with so much of everyday living taking place amidst widespread 
technological activity (e.g. automatic email update, GPS location services on 
mobile phones, programmable domestic climate control systems, ‘intelligent’ 
digital television services, government monitoring of mobile phone commu-
nications). Ae idea that our lives are produced in concert with technolo-
gies, and as such they form part of our way of being is not new. For instance 
Heidegger (1977) wrote extensively that technics have always been a key part 
of constituting the parameters and operation of human life, from early hunter-
gatherers’ use of weapons for hunting to modern computer systems organizing 
tax records. Such ideas have been taken up in cyberspace theory in seeking to 
avoid a dualistic model of humans and technologies as distinct forms of being 
(Brown 1999).
Ae changes to technologies in recent times present new roles for them 
as organizational forces on living (e.g. online shopping and social networking 
technology). Ae rise in the currency of information required in new body-
technology assemblages potentially present people with new ways of consider-
ing what constitutes their subjectivity. So long classified by the flesh of bodies, 
this is seriously being challenged by the multiple informatics of online technol-
ogy. Ais means that retaining awareness of the totality of information activ-
ity is seen as beyond the capacity of consciousness, so falls to the realm of 
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technology, through the multiple organisational and personal databases that 
record, store and use information. Ae shift in currency towards information 
becomes a threat to human consciousness in terms of rendering it secondary (a 
point noted by Arift (2004) with the term ‘technological unconscious’ in ref-
erence to the amount of life making that goes on in and by technology outside 
of human awareness).
N. Katherine Hayles (2006) takes this up with the notion of cognisphere 
(drawn from Aomas Whalen 2000); designating the distribution of thought 
across human and technology rather than being the sole reserve of the former. 
For Hayles holding on to an idea that cognition is solely a human capacity is 
outdated, as we can see multiple ways in which ‘thought’ occurs outside the 
realms of human psychological function. For instance, Hayles uses the exam-
ple of the National Security Agency’s computer system that captures over two 
million pieces of information per hour about US citizens and scans it for infor-
mation deemed potentially suspect (2006). Such ‘computer thinking’ occurs 
autonomously, without oversight from humans. Hayles argues that framing the 
human as the primary source of agency is no longer a useful or valid method, 
instead we must broaden scope to include the multifarious technological activ-
ity that shapes our lives. It is amidst this technological unconscious that sub-
jectivity is said to emerge, as a partial awareness of the totality of information 
production (Beer 2009).
Ais has clear implications for notions of subjectivity. Increased tech-
nological capability suggests decreased human action. Such ideas have led to 
concerns regarding technological determinism (e.g. Jordan 2008; Schroeder 
2007); are we entering a world in which technology rules? Science fiction, 
along with popular culture, has often suggested this to be the case, or at least 
offered stories of worlds in which technology runs amok (e.g. Hollywood films 
such as Minority Report and Blade Runner). However, we are not alone in con-
sidering this too much of a simplification. As Heidegger (and many others) 
note, technologies have always played an active role in constituting the condi-
tions of living. What changes is their particular make up, and the resultant 
changing nature of human-technological living. We seek to examine this in 
relation to modern information technologies and their insatiable appetite for 
information in terms of the ways of living they afford. Defining subjectivity 
as a singular form within such mobile terrains would be an error. Instead, the 
notion of digitally mediated selves is designed to capture some of the reality of 
the speed and movement of the capture and use of information derived from 
us, and the multiple journeys, transformative and not, that informational flows 
take in the shaping of everyday life. Ais can involve addressing how people 
make sense of the shaping forces of computer technology on their lives, and 
attend to the fluidity and speed of informational flow. 
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Surveillance and Information
Approaching these issues empirically involves analysing the emergence of 
forms of subjectivity produced against the modern technological backdrop. 
Key to this is analysis of the emergence and flow of information pertaining to 
people’s lives, with an eye for the forces by and through which information 
flows and is put to use. We have already noted the definitive nature of infor-
mation in terms of its longevity; being recorded, stored and used. Literature 
from the area of Surveillance Studies is useful here as it refers directly to the 
issue of the potential visibility of people through monitoring of information 
by others, such as organisations that harvest personal data. Several theories 
have emerged regarding the use of information by organisations. Aese include 
those derived from the Foucauldian panopticon logic of disciplinary power, 
itself largely a response to the proliferation of forms of visual surveillance. 
As noted, the gradual informationalisation of self proffers new and distinct 
problems in terms of its designation of identity and its visibility. For instance, 
visual surveillance (i.e. CCTV) records and stores images of people; hence its 
designation of self is embodied, as it is the visibility of people’s bodies that 
is captured and stored. Visual surveillance presents an identity based on the 
body as visible; people can be monitored and potentially held accountable 
for bodily action. It is one layer of self used as the marker for appropriate or 
inappropriate behaviour. Forms of visual surveillance do not monitor, store or 
utilise other layers of what constitutes the self, namely the abundant amount 
of information produced through and by engaging with computer techno-
logies. Ae panopticon model of Foucault has somewhat given way to ideas 
concerned with promulgating a model of surveillance as more fragmented 
and disparate, in which the notion of an all-powerful minority surveilling 
the powerless masses is replaced by the idea of surveillance as assemblages 
(Deleuze 1992). Aese new ‘societies of control’ conceptualise people as ‘divi-
duals’ rather than ‘individuals’, as they are now constituted by multiple forms 
of codes and passwords which are the required currency for access to modern 
social technologies (Deleuze 1992). Such a model takes us some way towards 
understanding the shift from bodies to information in the constitution of self, 
although in a rather general sense. Attention to the particular technological 
practices that enact informationalisation and the specifics of those processes 
is lacking. Aere are efforts to this end; some tend to focus on the technolo-
gical capabilities of IT systems and databases, whilst others approach from 
the interface between people-technologies. For example, Lyon’s notion of 
‘social sorting’ attempts to analyse the organised workings of multiple forms 
of information technologies that capture and record information and use it 
to categorise people into particular social groups for a range of purposes (e.g. 
marketing). Understanding how such practices impact on people’s lives, in 
terms of the kinds of uses, reactions and potential forms of resistance to them 
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is argued to be a necessary empirical need (Lyon 2002). Lyon captures some 
of the infrastructural understanding of the role of such systems of information 
that dominate modern society, and in doing so, create ‘data-subjects’. What 
we know less about are the localized experiences of people who become users 
of, and used by, information technologies. Understanding some of the ways 
that specific bodies and spaces are organised according to the algorithmic 
logic of computer databases is important, and Lyon’s edited collection provi-
des a range of examples of this (Lyon 2002).
Ae aforementioned concerns necessitate an approach to agency that 
understands and approaches it as a multiple and context specific product of 
everyday practices with information technologies. To conceptualise agency as 
a distinct entity with a singular form of identity and organisation would be to 
blinker oneself to the shifting nature of practices for which agency is a con-
cern. Such a model features in traditional notions of agency that conceptualise 
it as a human capability for intentional conscious action. Willful reflective 
activity is accordingly seen to define agency, and to be solely a human facet. 
However, presenting agency in this way, as something that exists over which 
control is negotiated can be a problematic conceptualisation, as it requires 
a spatialisation of that category. It can be more beneficial to consider agency 
as a practice; a mode of organising one’s self in relation to a particular set of 
concerns (Latour 2005). Jane Bennett sums this up as “[H]uman agency again 
appears as a vexed concept, through its snarls and dilemmas are easy to skate 
over when the alternatives are reduced to either a free human agency or passive, 
deterministic matter” (2010).
Hence, the aim of the paper is to analyse some of the everyday practices 
through which issues of agency are experienced. Ais involves addressing the 
level of awareness of people regarding how information flows through bodies 
and technologies, from initial disclosure to technological immersion during 
which it is subject to potential transformation. Some or all of this may go 
unnoticed by people during internet activity. For instance, are people always 
aware of targeted advertising that occurs when online? If so, do they under-
stand the processes through which this happens? Others may be acutely aware 
of some or all of the ways information about, or derived from, them is used by 
external organisations (e.g. government agencies, retailers, private companies). 
Aese questions drive the analysis of interviews in this paper. Ae argument 
is that our lives are becoming shaped by increasing amounts of information 
derived from us, potentially transformed by, and then utilized in, engagement 
with a variety of information technologies. Ae aim of this paper is to approach 
these issues empirically, through narratives of engagements with information 
technologies, with analysis focusing on how informational flows attempt to 
shape psychological life and in doing so transfer facets traditionally seen as 
human (e.g. agency and identity) into technological realms of computer data-
bases and their software algorithms. 
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Methodological Considerations
Ae methodological approach of the project from which this paper derives 
involved thirty-one semi-structured interviews with Londoners and people 
from the South East on England about their experiences with information 
technologies. Ais primarily involved internet use but also included non-inter-
net technologies such as Government databases. Ais paper focuses on parts of 
interviews relating to the recording, storage and use of personal information. 
Interviewees were asked about their experiences in relation to disclosing infor-
mation, including on the internet along with a range of non-internet organisa-
tions. Ae aim was to look at the forms of digitally mediated selves produced, 
e.g. through the ways that awareness of technologisation occurs, and how this 
revolves around notions of agency. Ae interviews were analysed using a the-
oretically informed discourse analysis, in which the understanding of people 
as becoming increasingly informationalised guided the analytic process. Ae 
interviews allowed this approach to be augmented by specific empirical focus 
on the production of digitally mediated selves. 
The Production of Digitally Mediated Selves
Ae analysis focuses on the question of the role of information technology in 
the constitution of what we are calling digitally mediated selves. Ais involves 
looking for instances in which information, through online technology, acts 
as a shaping force on life. Ae aim is for a greater sense of the role informa-
tion technologies can play in producing everyday life in the form of digitally 
mediated selves. Ae analysis focuses on three factors; becoming conscious of 
the technological unconscious; technologies knowing the self and thinking 
surveillantly. 
Becoming conscious of the technological unconscious
Ais section focuses on the production of awareness of how personal informa-
tion can be used by online technologies such as social networking sites. Key 
here is to analyse this as an instance when consciousness of the operation of 
information technology emerges, with people’s reaction to this. In the follo-
wing extracts we see Fatima talking about the role of personal information in 
internet activity:
Extract 1
I: So you were aware of it?
F: Yeah but I didn’t really think of it. Like I’m I know that when you’re 
shopping and stuff it remembers what stuff you generally look at and even 
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internet whatever you search it remembers it I guess I didn’t think that 
data gets stored I didn’t think of it that way.
I: Which way? So you said you were aware of it, that stuff <yeah> 
but?
F: But I never really thought of it as stuff that err you know informa-
tion that gets saved about you <ok>.
I: So is it the saving the holding of it which is novel?
F: Just the fact that it links back to, your identity I suppose its 
<ok> never really thought about that (4) it’s a bit scary (laughter) (lines 
189–199).
Extract 2
I: Right could you expand a bit on that, the scariness of it?
F: Erm I don’t know I never really even though I’m on Facebook I 
never thought of it as a way of sharing information erm I don’t know 
how to explain it. I think offering your details onto other people where 
erm then you don’t know really what they’re going to do with it whereas 
people you originally give it to you know the reasons <mmm> and you’re 
fine with it obviously because you give it them, but when they pass it on 
then you don’t really know what it’s used for and that can be a bit scary 
I think.
I: Ok erm so it’s the not knowing? <I suppose so> and that the diffe-
rence between <yeah> giving it directly and, <yeah> it being passed on?
F: Yeah cause you don’t know whether it is being passed on to safe  
[inaudible] or…
I: Ok so it’s about who it’s being passed on to. 
F: Yeah and what they’re gonna use it for… (lines 208–221)
Aese two extracts come from a section of an interview with Fatima 
(aged 21) in which a list of technologies that record personal information is 
being discussed. Fatima demonstrates unawareness of the reality of informa-
tion storage, claiming “I didn’t think data gets stored.” Recognition dawns on 
Fatima regarding the production of the self through digital information. It is 
one thing for information to be disclosed during online shopping, for example, 
but the storage of it is a more pressing concern, as it opens up the possibility 
for this to be traceable to individuals. Ae personalisation of information; the 
recording of that aspect of our lives (e.g. shopping habits and preferences) by 
organizations such as online retailers, comes as something of an undesired reali-
sation for Fatima. It is not a complete revelation, as she states an understanding 
that information is transferred during internet activity (e.g. social networking), 
but the broader lack of awareness regarding how far such information can be 
distributed introduces a new level to her understanding. Arough the record-
ing and storage of personal information new practices of agency emerge that 
involve technology taking a more active role. Information recording and stor-
age is run by technology, and awareness of this comes a concern for Fatima. 
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Once information is disclosed agency leaves her and enters the technologi-
cal realm. Fatima’s information becomes the latest addition to a technological 
unconscious whose operation is largely unknown. Its mere presence can act as 
anxiety provoking, eliciting a fearful response. 
In the extract the movement of information into unpredictable spaces is 
framed as human. Fatima refers to concern regarding who such information 
will be passed on to, not what. Despite agency flowing from human to technol-
ogy through the disclosure of information, Fatima’s concern is framed as agency 
transferring through technology to another person or people, which draws on 
a traditional model of agency as a human facet. Anthropomorphism is a well-
known cultural tool for representing technological knowledge (Bennett 2010). 
For Fatima, her sense of self at that moment is felt to be under threat by the 
capture of information. If information was benign, meaningless, this may be 
less of an issue, but for Fatima this is ‘scary’ because it links back to identity, 
a central pillar of self. Ae transformation of agency over subjectivity into the 
abyss of technology is a concern for Fatima. Ae idea that potentially some 
control over her can be gained by ‘persons unknown’ is something she needs 
to address when realising her information is stored. Ae concern is defined as 
a fear that in using technology she opens herself up to the possibility of mak-
ing connections with people she does not know, who can then gain access to 
her (which could be due to the information being dealt with in contexts it 
was not meant to be). Ae ownership of subjectivity becomes up for grabs at 
this point. Connections through technology potentially recalibrate subjectiv-
ity. Moreover, control over connections is deemed difficult. Once a connection 
is made, which for Fatima is expressed as occurring through Facebook, they 
can multiply and control is lost. Computer technology is so fertile that once 
information is released it can multiply through the speed of movement across 
networks of distributed agency. 
Technological knowing of the self – shaping the future
Ae previous section demonstrated what awareness of the role of information 
technologies in capturing and storing personal information can mean for peo-
ple. In this following extract an example of how personal information can 
subsequently be put to use by technology in the form of targeted advertising 
is explored. Of particular interest is how information technologies can act as 
a potential shaping force on life through using information derived from past 
internet activity. Ae extract features Michelle talking about experiences with 
online shopping and targeted advertising:
Extract 3
M: I had an experience recently where I was researching, looking for 
something I wanted to buy, for Christmas present I think, and all of a 
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sudden I was on email and all these adverts started popping up, from the 
companies that I’d looked at and even companies that I hadn’t looked 
at it with products on; I think I was looking for a coat or something 
and all these (laughs) there were pop ups started coming up from M&S 
and House of Fraser with all these coats and I thought ‘how did you 
know I was looking at coats?’ <yeah> and I found that quite frightening 
because I felt like I was being watched <mmm> even though I know it’s 
just a computerised system and I don’t know the technicalities of it but 
somehow somebody’s just scan it some system  scanning what’s going 
on I don’t know if it’s linked to email addresses or just (2) I don’t know 
what it’s linked to… (lines 387–397).
In this extract Michelle (aged 38) narrates an account in which the soft-
ware algorithms of online retailers operate as agentic practices of attempting 
to organise her life though targeted advertising. Ae recording and storage of 
information derived from earlier online browsing is not visible to Michelle; she 
cannot see the information that is stored. Her awareness of its existence comes 
through the later pop up adverts. Ais becomes an agentic force of transforma-
tion that shifts into and through the technological realm. It is both embodied 
and virtual; the former in the initial browsing and the latter on entry to the 
technological realm. Its form is not static though, as we see attempts to shape 
embodied life emerge through the later pop-up adverts for coats (which if 
bought and worn would be embodied).
It is the agentic practice of targeted advertising that comes to act as 
a problem for Michelle. Firstly in terms of its existence (“I found that quite 
frightening because I felt like I was being watched”), and secondly due to not 
knowing how it works (“I don’t know what it’s linked to”). Expressing knowl-
edge of the process of information being recorded and stored in the technologi-
cal realm of computer databases involves agency as a marker of displeasure and 
concern. It is not just annoyance at experiencing pop up adverts, but a deeper 
disruption and challenge to self, through the feeling of being surveilled by 
something. Even though Michelle is aware that this is unlikely to be a person 
(“I know it’s just a computerised system”), the feeling is one of being watched 
by an other. Societal referents for such feelings often involve other people, e.g. 
being watched through visual surveillance (e.g. CCTV cameras). An attempt 
to lessen this anxiety is seen when Michelle states she knows she is not being 
watched by another person, and yet the alternative proves to also be an anxi-
ety provoking option as it involves trying to make sense of the operation of 
technological agency. Whilst Michelle can lessen the concern about being 
surveilled by another person through expressing recognition that “it’s just 
a computerised system,” the incomprehensibility of that system raises alterna-
tive concerns. Latour (2005) talks about agency needing to be characterised 
through figuration, the process of giving it form. Ais can be anthropomor-
phic, which is a well-known strategy of attempting to make sense of computer 
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systems (e.g. Dennett 1971). Michelle moves away from this possibility by 
demarcating being watched by another human and the notion that the record-
ing, storage and use of personal information is operated by computer systems. 
Given their lack of understanding of how the process of ‘tracking’ works, the 
process of figuration is disrupted. 
Further detail of Michelle’s response to this can be seen in the following 
extract:
Extract 4
I was on Google and all these pop ups started coming up or maybe I 
was on Kelkoo or something, a comparison site <ok> and all these pop 
ups just came up you know and it was literally everything I’d been looking 
at and it wasn’t ‘you’ve been looking at it’ it was just advertising but it was 
the first time I’d experienced anything like that and it reminded me of the 
film minority report <ok> when he walks into a shopping mall and sud-
denly it’s ‘hello can’t remember what his name is <mmm> John Smith last 
time you were here you bought three pairs of jeans’….. that sort of thing 
is just a bit full on isn’t it? (laughter) and if that’s the way it’s heading, 
but that’s what it made me think of <yeah> very exaggerated it was the 
same thing but that was a very exaggerated form of it <mmm> but that is 
really sort of that would be going too far and is incredibly intrusive to be 
bombarded with you bought this last time ooh maybe I want to buy some 
more of those and it’s bordering on becoming a bit manipulative <right> 
….. it’s just my my reaction to those pop ups coming up was, that’s scary 
because somebody or something somewhere knows what I’ve been doing 
for the last hour <yeah> and I find that scary, threatening is probably the 
wrong word just, it’s probably scary because I didn’t know how it worked 
and I wasn’t aware that’s it’s out there and I suppose it’s one of those things 
that again I just become used to like when you see surveillance cameras 
around just become used to the fact that they’re there and that’s how the 
world is going (lines 410–446).
Ae extract above demonstrates some further concern and confusion 
regarding attempting to make sense or know how the process of information 
capture, storage and use works. Ae software algorithms underlying targeted 
advertising act to try to shape Michelle’s future life. Her experience manifests as 
a digitally mediated self, the relational production of bodies and information. 
It then acts as a force on activity through attempting to shape later life (Bogard 
1996). Michelle’s use of the term ‘brainwashing’ is noteworthy as it alludes to 
technology as insidious; entering and taking over one’s internal psychological 
space. It is as if through experiencing targeted advertising Michelle is exposed 
to the potential of technology becoming the means by which to think, or per-
haps render thought redundant (as noted by Turkle’s 2005 concept of ‘thought 
prosthetics’). Who needs to think if technology can direct activity? Although 
only referring to one part of life, namely shopping, Michelle expresses concern 
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in a wider sense, in terms of technology becoming a force across other areas of 
life (“that’s how the world is going”). 
Ae above examples demonstrate ways that information flows across 
networks of human and technology in agentic practices for shaping life and 
producing digitally mediated selves. Michelle’s experiences are the relational 
product of embodied and technological activity. Target advertising of simi-
lar items to those previously purchased/browsed shows how information in 
internet activity is constantly subject to change. Ae original encounters (e.g. 
browsing for a coat on an online retailer’s website) were made up of commu-
nicating potential preferences for coats. Ais information is then used by the 
computer database to link to related items it ‘thinks’ the consumers may want. 
Here, ‘thinking’ is technological, not human. From Michelle’s perspective this 
is a concern, because it infers a form of surveillance, and also as it insinu-
ates some form of attempt to organise life. Preference and desires are usually 
only known by individuals themselves (unless willingly shared with others), 
so recognizing that technologies develop knowledge of these, and use such 
information, is a new challenge. What becomes interesting at this stage are the 
possible effects this has on people’s thinking and activity, how it feeds back into 
everyday living. 
Thinking surveillantly
As Aift (2004, 2005) notes, the idea that technologies act as a shaping force 
on our social environments in ways we are not wholly aware of resonates with 
the reality of living in societies of information. Ae previous two sections pro-
vided examples of processes of becoming aware of technologies acting as forms 
of information surveillance, and the potential psychological effects therein, 
namely feeling that our interior psychological space, full of thoughts, desires, 
prejudices, are coming to be known by information technologies. In this final 
section attention is drawn towards how processes under threat of externaliza-
tion come to be re-internalised into forms of thinking surveillantly. 
Extract 5
R: Ah internet has changed everything completely the way data’s been 
collected and kept and stored erm <has that shaped your attitude at all?> 
Just me being aware that my data is being collected from different measu-
res or different things I do that goes through the world wide web already 
make me a bit more conscious about how much data I give away about 
myself <ok, right> you know. I know people collect data from all different 
sources so that has always made me to be a bit more cautious about what 
I do and how much data about me that I put through the internet or 
through any other modern technology we use these days <I see> absolu-
tely…. (lines 230–237). 
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In this section with Roger (aged 40) a mode of activity is seen to emerge, 
shaped by consciousness of the storage of personal information by online tech-
nology (the internet). In Michelle’s extract technologies were framed in terms 
of extracting people’s inner psychological activity and storing and using this. 
For Michelle, this was akin to a form of brainwashing, which resonates with 
the idea of technologies taking on some of the activities traditionally seen as 
operating as internal psychological phenomena (e.g. cognition). With Roger, 
part of a process is seen in which, through consciousness dawning of the extent 
of potential surveillance of information, a new mode of activity is formed. Ais 
demonstrates how subjectivity and technology are produced as fluid processes, 
shifting in the specific emergence as situational happenings. Roger’s extract 
highlights a mode of thinking surveillantly, shaped by consciousness of the 
surveillant workings of online technologies whose modus operandi is to con-
tinually harvest information provided by people. Ae caution Roger mentions 
becomes a form of subjectivity, manifest as his behaviour of using the internet 
with an ever present wariness regarding the disclosure of personal information 
(“a bit more conscious about how much data I give away about myself ”). Ais 
process is framed as the internalizing of mode of operating of the externalized 
force of technology. It is not just a reaction, as this would to set up individual 
action and information technology as unrelated entities. It is better understood 
as a part of a process of subjectivity production in the form of a digitally medi-
ated self. Roger’s internet activity is shaped by the operation and organiza-
tion of online technologies reliant on information. Aeir mode of activity (e.g. 
continually recording information) becomes a way of being for him, he starts 
to live his life in anticipation of being under the watchful gaze of the internet. 
He begins to think and act surveillantly. His life is shaped by awareness of the 
surveillance of his information. 
Conclusions
Ais paper has offered empirical analysis of productions of subjectivity in the 
form of digitally mediated selves in contemporary information societies. Ae 
aim has been to highlight ways that technologies, as surveillers of information, 
are acting as agentic forces over the constitution of individuals’ lives. We are 
not suggesting a form of technological determinism through stating the infor-
mation technologies under focus are all powerful (Lyon 2002). Rather, the aim 
has been to analyse the kinds of experiences that can emerge at the interface of 
bodies and information technologies. Our analysis demonstrated several ways 
in which information becomes a key part of agentic practices that feed on 
information in attempting to shape and organise life. Digitally mediated selves 
emerge against the backdrop of a technological unconscious made up of the 
widespread embededness of information technologies in modern societies. Ae 
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precise workings of the software algorithms behind information technologies 
(e.g. search engines) are not widely known and understood. With our partici-
pants we saw practices based on a certain level of ignorance, prior to becoming 
aware of the potential ubiquity of information capture and storage, which is 
not in itself always a problem, but concern can emerge when the presence 
of information as an agentic force is experienced (e.g. in the case of targeted 
advertising). 
Subjectivity is conceptualized as the product of bodies, information and 
technology, and the distribution of agency across these realms. Ae personali-
sation of technological activity such as targeted advertising operates in a way 
much ‘closer’ to individuals through its ability to gather personal informa-
tion. Ais can bring benefits, such as easy access to goods and services, but 
can also produce wariness and concern, through the presence of information 
technologies seeming to know us. It is through things such as targeted advertis-
ing that awareness of the existence and workings of societies of information 
(Arift’s technological unconscious) can emerge. One of the key issues is trying 
to make sense of and reconcile ourselves to being known by computers, when 
knowledge of their precise workings is largely unknown (e.g. Google’s algo-
rithms). Moreover, this technological knowing takes place through the infor-
mationalisation of factors considered key to notions of self, such as identity. As 
such, these processes and states traditionally classified as internal psychological 
phenomena become externalised through the role of information technologies 
as agentic forces. Agency and identity, key stalwarts of long-standing under-
standings of what constitutes humanity, become, to a lesser or greater degree, 
technological formations. Ae participants discussed information technologies 
as a threat to one’s inner self, which no longer can be relied upon to be private. 
Ais is not to suggest people’s desires, thoughts, prejudices become public, as it 
is technologies that surveil them post storage and use, not people. Nevertheless 
a process of externalization is underway, whose mode of operation subsequently 
becomes internalized in the production of surveillant modes of thinking and 
action. Ais was seen in the cautious mode of being Roger enacted through 
awareness of the extent of storage of his information.
Aere are methods of attempting to resist recording of personal infor-
mation by information technologies of course, such as deleting the software 
cookies. However, few of our participants mentioned doing this, or awareness 
of how it could be done. Instead we saw examples of experiences produced 
at the joining of bodies and technology (on the same ‘plane’ (Lash 2002)) 
that demonstrated the role of information technologies in agentic practices of 
shaping everyday life through the capture and transformative use of people’s 
personal information. Digitally mediated selves within such systems become 
the product of distributed practices of agency within a system of communica-
tion in which control is not easily located or grasped. Ais is not a system that 
neatly fits previous theories of disciplinary control (i.e. Foucault), but is about 
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how we adapt to distributed understandings of control and agency. Deleuze’s 
societies of control (1992) provide some grounding to these debates, but he 
was writing in pre-Web 2.0 times, in which the capability for attempting new 
forms of technologically facilitated democracy (e.g. the role of social network-
ing in Middle East uprisings in 2011, and a series of anti-austerity protests in 
the UK in 2010–11) was yet to emerge. What Deleuze does offer is a turn to 
communication, and the role of power and agency in constituting it, as the 
necessary focus of attention. In this paper we saw forms of digitally mediated 
selves enacted in part by technology playing a constitutive role over life though 
factors traditionally seen as human facets (e.g. identity and agency). We have 
continued along the communication line that Deleuze (1992) set out on, and 
with societies of information promising to get bigger and stronger, the job of 
the social sciences is to try to keep up with these shifts and analyse the implica-
tions for everyday living. 
REFERENCES
Beer, D. 2007. “Aoughtful Territories: Imagining the Ainking Power of Aings and 
Spaces.” City 11 (2): 229–238.
_________. 2009. “Power through the Algorithm? Participatory Web Cultures and the 
Technological Unconscious.” New Media & Society 11 (6): 985–1002.
Bennett, J. 2010. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of )ings. Durham: Duke 
University Press.
Bogard, W. 1996. )e Simulation of Surveillance: Hypercontrol in Telematic Societies. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brown, S. D. 1999. “Electronic Networks and Subjectivity.” In Cyberpsychology, eds. 
A. J. Gordo-Lopez, I. Parker, 146–165. London: Macmillan.
Castells, M. 2004. )e Network Society: A Cross-Cultural Perspective. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar.
Castells, M., Cardosa, G., eds. 2005. )e Network Society: From Knowledge to Power. 
Washington, D. C.: Ae Johns Hopkins University Press.
Crang, M., Graham, S. 2007. “Sentient Cities: Ambient Intelligence and the Politics of 
Urban Space.” Information, Communication and Society 10 (6): 789–817.
Deleuze, G. 1992. “Postscript on Societies of Control.” October 50: 3–7.
Dennett, D. C. 1971. “Intentional Systems.” Journal of Philosophy 68: 87–106.
Fuchs, Ch. 2011. Foundations of Critical Media and Information Studies. London: 
Routledge.
Hayles, N. K. 2006. “Unfinished Work.” )eory, Culture & Society 23 (7–8): 
159–166.
Heidegger, M., Lovitt, W. 1977. )e Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays. 
New York, London: Harper and Row.
Jordan, T. 2008. Hacking: Digital Media and Technological Determinism. Cambridge: 
Polity.
Lash, S. 2002. Critique of Information. London: Sage Publications.

KULTŪRA IR VISUOMENĖ. Socialinių tyrimų žurnalas. .  (). ISSN - 
Latour, B. 2005. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-network-)eory, 
Clarendon Lectures in Management Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lyon, D. 2002. “Everyday Surveillance: Personal Data and Social Classifications.” 
Information, Communication and Society 5 (2): 242–257.
_________, ed. 2002. Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk and Digital 
Discrimination. London: Routledge.
Pariser, E. 2011. )e Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from you. New York: 
Viking.
Schroeder, R. 2007. Rethinking Science, Technology, and Social Change. Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press.
Arift, N. 2004. “Remembering the Technological Unconscious by Foregrounding 
Knowledges of Position. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 22 (1): 
175–190.
________. 2005. Knowing Capitalism. London: Sage Publications.
Turkle, Sh. 2005. )e Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit. Cambridge: 
Massachussetts: MIT Press.
Webster, F. 2006. )eories of the Information Society. 3rd ed. London: Routledge.
Whalen, A. 2000. “Data Navigation, Architectures of Knowledge.” In Banff Summit 
on Living Architectures: Designing for Immersion and Interaction. Banff New Media 
Institute.
Transformaciniai veiksmo procesai: informacinės 
technologijos ir skaitmeniškai medijuojamų „aš“ gamyba 
Santrauka
Naujųjų medijų technologijos tampa vis svarbesne kasdienio gyvenimo sudedamąja 
dalimi. Šių technologijų plėtra meta naujų iššūkių esminiams individualaus „aš“ aspek-
tams – veiksmui ir tapatybei. Potencialiai šias sąvokas patikrinti įmanoma naudojantis 
naujomis veiksmo formomis, informacinėms technologijoms ėmus vaidinti vis didesnį 
vaidmenį mūsų gyvenimuose. Šiame kontekste veiksmas nėra tai, ką galima sukonkre-
tinti ir lengvai išmatuoti arba suvokti kaip išimtinai intencionalų žmogišką veiksmą. 
Veiksmą reikia traktuoti kaip tai, kas tampa gyvenimą kuriančiomis praktikomis. Šias 
idėjas straipsnio autoriai pritaiko aptardami asmenų patirtis, susijusias su informaci-
nėmis technologijomis. Analizuojant pusiau struktūruotus interviu su informantais iš 
Londono ir Jungtinės Karalystės pietryčių dalies, siekiama parodyti, kaip informacinės 
technologijos informaciniu veiksmu potencialiai transformuoja asmenų subjektyvumą. 
Informantų naudojimasis informacinėmis technologijomis yra sudėtingesnis ir turi 
daugiau niuansų, nei juos gali aprašyti „arba gerai, arba blogai“ takoskyra. Net ir tada, 
kai į šias technologijas žvelgiama įtariai ar susirūpinus, jos naudojamos turint ome-
nyje jų įsivaizduojamą naudą. Koncentruojantis į potencialų tapatybės ir subjektyvumo 
technologizavimą, straipsnyje teigiama: skaitmeniniu būdu medijuojamos naujos „aš“ 
formos iškyla tada, kai kasdienius mūsų gyvenimus vis labiau apibrėžia ne mūsų kūnai, 
o informacija. Straipsnis baigiamas svarstymais apie iššūkius, su kuriais susiduria mūsų 
patirtys, ir reflekcijomis apie subjektyvumo, kurį formuoja nepaliaujamas gyvenimo 
informacionalizavimas, sampratas.
